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Magna Carta, Human Rights and the Archaeology of an Idea 
 
(A paper given at the University, Magna Graecia, Catanzaro, Italy, July 2010 
as part of the International Postgraduate Seminar Series.) 
 
Archaeology: the scientific study of ancient cultures through the examination of their 
material remains such as buildings, graves, tools, and other artefacts usually dug up 
from the ground 
 
When professor la Torre asked me to give a seminar on human rights I readily 
agreed. This was perhaps foolish of me. I have been an academic manager for 
too long and have done little research recently. I thought my audience would 
very soon discover that I was a fraud. But as is often the case when one finds 
oneself in extremis, a strange  thing happened. There was an interesting 
concatenation of events that led me to begin thinking in a different way about 
human rights.  
 
Possibly the first thing to remark is that I thought I knew a reasonable amount 
about the phenomena that we today call human rights. I thought I knew 
about the genesis of the idea; the broad structure of the international human 
rights system; the domestic institutionalisation of human rights, as well as 
some of the contemporary theories which are a major part of human rights 
discourse. I even thought I knew about the legal hermeneutics of human 
rights – how various institutions interpret human rights and the judicial 
devices used within particular socio-political contexts to achieve particular 
outcomes. Then of course, I realised that the wider my circle of knowledge, 
the greater the circumference of my ignorance. This realisation received 
further confirmation when I was asked to become part of national enterprise 
in the UK to celebrate the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta in 2015 
through education. (Lincoln Cathedral holds one of the four extant copies of 
the original English Great Charter of Liberties.)  
 
It was then I realised that the depths of my ignorance were truly profound. I 
knew of course that Magna Carta was a significant constitutional document, 
not only for the UK, but for other common law states too. Indeed, the citizens 
of the USA appear to esteem Magna Carta more highly than their UK 
counterparts, and, significantly, it was the American Bar Association that paid 
for the monument that now stands at Runnymede, an island in the River 
Thames, where King John put his seal to the original document in 1215. Even 
more astounding is the fact that 15 million people turned out to view the 
Lincoln Magna Carta in the US when it was held in the Library of Congress 
for safekeeping during the Second World War. And as recently as 3 July 2010, 
the Queen of Great Britain and Nothern Ireland laid the cornerstone of the 
Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg.1 The Observer newspaper 
in the UK reported the occasion with more than a little hyperbole as follows:  
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‘The stone used in the ceremony comes from Runnymede in England – where 
Magna Carta was issued in 1215 signalling the beginnings of democracy in 
Britain.’  
 
When we look further at recent history we can see claims by a number of 
eminent people  – some of them even lawyers - that the Magna Carta has, 
whether rightly or wrongly, been the source of inspiration for a number of 
contemporary legal of quasi-legal documents. Eleanor Roosevelt, who was a 
leading figure in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
referred to it in her speech in the UN General Assembly on 10 August 1948 
called the Declaration the ‘Magna Carta of Mankind’. The Convention on 
Civil International Aviation (the Chicago Convention) has been referred to as 
‘the Magna Charta of public international air law’.2 The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 has been called a ‘Magna Carta’ for 
the oceans3 and the compact between the Crown and the indigenous people 
of New Zealand has been termed the ‘Maori Magna Carta’.4  
 
Leaving aside the imperfect use of language and the perhaps over-inflated 
claims in some of these descriptions, these discoveries prompted me to ask 
why the ideas embodied in this medieval document, the product of a feudal 
society, have become the touchstone against which some would wish to 
measure our concept of liberty under the law and one of the foundations of 
human rights in the 21st century. (It should also be mentioned that the Magna 
Carta was inscribed on UNESCO’s register of the ‘Memory of the World’ in 
2009 following nomination by the British Government.) 
 
That question is, I suspect, incapable of a simple answer. The provisions of the 
Magna Carta concerning the protection of property rights and personal liberty 
clearly resonate with US constitutionalists and Canadian human rights 
lawyers, but as we reveal the layers of history we perhaps find that the 
original ideas of the Great Charter have become … well, what have they 
become? Distorted? Warped? Refined? Elevated? Transmuted? Can we really 
treat it, as so many modern collections of human rights documents do, as 
some kind of proto-human rights document?5 Much, I would suggest, 
depends on what our teleological understanding of human rights is. And in 
asking this question we must not fall into the trap, as some authors and 
commentators do, of anachronism. We must also avoid the risks inherent in 
adhering to an unduly linear or culturally specific view of history or one in 
which the importance of social context is disregarded.6 Furthermore, we – or 
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at least some of us - need to shift our thinking from that which automatically 
associates human rights with a progressive liberalism. Human Rights, and 
human rights institutions, as Prof Koskenniemi has cogently argued are as 
much the product of hegemony as other rules of law and are capable of 
holding all possible positions within them, as long as the discourse take place 
using the grammar and vocabulary of human rights.7 
 
Without wishing to rehearse rights discourse in detail, it might be argued that 
the fundamental characteristic of human rights is that they have a value that 
is superior to ordinary law. To put it in the words of Ronald Dworkin, rights 
operate to ‘trump’ other rules.8 How they acquire that status is, in a general 
sense, unclear, but in many constitutions, human rights provisions are given 
protected status – for example by entrenchment - and can only be repealed by 
exceptional measures, such as a special majority of the legislative body. In 
some states, the US is the prime example here, legislation that is inconsistent 
with specially entrenched rights documents, will be null and void as 
unconstitutional. In this sense we (lawyers? politicians? the general 
populace?) have willed human rights (or civil rights) to be special; they 
transcend ordinary law and render it its subject. It might also be something of 
a cliché to remark that the special status accorded to human rights emerge 
after periods of great political upheaval – the French Declaration of the Rights 
of the Man and Citizen (1789), the US Bill of Rights (1791) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) - are examples of this proposition. 
Human rights documents function to cement in place the new constitutional 
order (hegemony) and might therefore be regarded as both radical in their 
origin but conservative in their purpose. (This does not mean that I would 
adhere to the idea of originalism exemplified by Justice Scalia in the US 
Supreme Court or the literalist interpretation of Judge Fitzmaurice in the early 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.) 
 
In one sense, the Magna Carta was the product of a similar perturbation of the 
existing political and social order in which one hegemony was replaced by 
another. It was a compact forced on the monarch, King John, by his over-
mighty subjects - his barons and clerics.9 John had overtaxed his subjects to 
support his adventures in France, acted ruthlessly to extort taxes and, to add 
insult to injury, he had excluded them from his inner council in favour of 
‘new men’. The barons rebelled and in an attempt to avoid civil war, John 
agreed to sign a charter that proposed to remedy their grievances. It was a 
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long document that focused primarily on property issues, for example 
whether a  widow could be compelled to marry a man of the king’s choice in 
order to keep the estates at the service of the king; who was permitted the 
right to take fish and where and so on. It was in its very essence a feudal 
document; a product of its time and social context. In a Foucauldian sense, it 
could be characterised as an example of resistance to power, but only by one 
privileged group against, in feudal terms, the sole source of legitimate 
authority. (Of course the Charter, somewhat predictably, appealed to God in 
this matter as a superior authority.) 
 
But how secure was this compact and how long was it intended to last? To 
understand these questions, it is necessary to consider King John’s 
relationship with the Church. In 1213 John had refused to accept Pope 
Innocent III’s candidate, Stephen Langton, as Archbishop of Canterbury. 
Relations between the Pope and John broke down; John was excommunicated 
by the Pope and a Papal interdict declared against England. By the time of the 
meeting with the barons and clerics at Runnymede, John had been forced to 
acquiesce in the Pope’s appointment and Langton had become Archbishop. 
Significantly, it is thought that Langton was the brains behind the Charter, 
which also included a provision protecting the ‘liberties of the Church’. No 
sooner was the Charter sealed, however, than Innocent III, encouraged by 
John, condemned it as having been exacted by coercion and declared it by 
Papal Bull to be null and void. In response to this, John reneged on his 
commitments to surrender castles, borrowed money to hire foreign troops, 
and rallied his forces to subdue the nobles. John’s plans – and the impending 
civil wars - were averted when he conveniently died in October 1216. The 
Charter, however, survived and, after three incarnations, was eventually 
entered onto the statute rolls by Edward I (the ‘Father of Parliament’) in 1297. 
This transformation of the Magna Carta from an extra-legal, higher form 
constitutional document to an ‘ordinary statute’ raised some interesting issues 
in subsequent centuries, as we shall see. The preamble, however, suggests 
that the Magna Carta was supposed to be the foundations of an 
autochthonous constitutional settlement that was to subsist in perpetuity. As 
King John declared: 
 
‘ … our will is that it be observed in good faith by our heirs forever. We have 
also granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all 
the underwritten liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us 
and our heirs forever.’ 
 
If we examine more closely the provisions of the Magna Carta, we can 
identify those that might be said to have had the most profound effect on the 
development of norms that could be viewed as having the characteristics of 
proto-human rights. In modern parlance we might refer to these as rules of 
due process of law and other norms relating to the fair administration of 
justice. These are as follows: 
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‘20. For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the 
degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so 
heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood.  
 
‘38. In future no official shall place a man on trial upon his own unsupported 
statement, without producing credible witness to the truth of it.  
 
‘39. No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other 
way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send other to do so, 
except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.  
 
‘40. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.  
 
‘45. We will appoint as justices, constable, sheriffs, or other officials, only men 
that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well.’ 
 
Let us focus on Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta (Cap 29 of the original 1215 
Charter), however, since, not least, it is the only provision of the document 
that remains in force today. Taken at face value, this formulation might seem 
to us a little strange, but if we examine it in its original context, it becomes less 
so. Take the words of Chapter 39 themselves, for they manifest the feudal, 
social context, particularly the earlier translation of original pig Latin that 
forbade a free man to be diseissed. Seisin was only a quality of full legal 
entitlement that existed in real property, so the extension to property in the 
later document is an extension of the prohibition to chattels – or moveable 
property – also.  
 
Status is clearly important, although the medieval understanding of status is 
not coterminous with our own. It is only freemen who shall not be so 
mistreated and they shall be judged only by his (not her) peers or by the law 
of the land. Furthermore, no one can be deprived of their standing (i.e. status) 
except by lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. Thus the 
rights in the Magna Carta were applicable only to certain people; they did not 
have universal application. And if the hallmark of human rights is that they 
are universal and equally applicable to all persons no matter what their rank 
or status, then we have an anachronism. It is arguable that until a society has 
an understanding of equality regardless of sex, ethnic origin or other status, 
then the rights in question, though they might be constitutional legal rights 
they are not human rights.  
 
Let us examine the notion of freemen a little further, since it is only freemen to 
whom the rights are originally given.10 In this period freemen were those of 
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free status in the eyes of the law (that is, not villeins, serfs or bondsmen who 
were bound to their masters) and as such they enjoyed certain rights denied 
to the ‘unfree’, such as access to the King’s courts in certain actions, freedom 
to move about the realm, to marry and exemption from certain duties. As 
Magna Carta became institutionalised through the statutory process, ‘no free 
man’ became ‘no man’ and then ultimately in 1354 ‘no man of whatsoever 
estate or condition he may be’. This might look like an early progression 
towards a fundamental legal equality of men (women were certainly not part 
of this formulation either in word or in fact), but what it fails to reveal are the 
fundamental changes that had taken place in English society over the 140 
years or so since the sealing of Charter in 1215. While there were those who 
were still unfree and bound to their lords, the categories of freemen had – 
with developing urbanisation - increased markedly, and these new status 
categories needed to be brought within the scope of the common law. Thus 
the motivation to include men of ‘whatsoever estate or condition’ was to 
render them subject to the common law, and therefore the process attendant 
upon the common law. In other words, it was an extension of hegemony 
uninformed by any anachronistic notion of fairness or equality. 
 
If we then look at the process we find that no free man is to suffer in person or 
property by action of the King except by the lawful judgement of his peers or 
by the law of the land. The Latin text here is ‘per legale judicium parium suorum 
vel per legem terrae’. Again, this phrase went through an interesting – and 
historically contingent – evolution. By the middle of the 14th century, trial by 
jury had become through custom and practice, part of the legem terrae. In 
order to regulate the process  of trial by jury, however, a number of statutes 
(the Six Statutes) were passed between 1331-1368. These might be seen as the 
beginnings of due process of law since they laid down the procedures 
through which a person might be brought before a court. The statutes of 1352 
declared that no one was to be ‘taken by petition or suggestion made to our 
lord the King or to his council, unless it be by indictment of good and lawful 
people of the same neighbourhood where the deeds be done in due manner, 
or process made by writ original at the common law.’ (What requires further 
investigation here is how a developing self-conception of the legal profession 
and lawyering might have influenced these developments some 140 years 
after the original Magna Carta.11 Almost certainly, the England of the mid-14th 
century was not the England of the early 13th century which was still in the 
relatively early days of colonial occupation.)  
 
None the less, here, in legislative form was the fusion of two compelling 
ideas: the notion that the common law applied to all men and that for the 
administration of the King’s justice clearly established procedures had to be 
followed if decisions were to be regarded as formally correct. (Here again, the 
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conception of proper, professional lawyering is of particular importance.12) In 
this fusion we can discern the genius – and genesis - of the concept of due 
process in both its substantive and procedural aspects.  These provisions 
remain in statutory force in England today, and the 1297 Magna Carta 
remains, chronologically, the first statute in the statute books to this day.13  
 
So an archaeological investigation of the admittedly slender foundations of 
Magna Carta has brought us to the point where we can see the emergence of a 
structure that is beginning to take on a recognisable modern form, distinct 
from its feudal origins. Time does not permit a thorough rehearsal of how the 
words of Magna Carta and their transformation from a limited pragmatic 
solution to a local conflict into a sophisticated legal edifice occurred. In order 
to do that we would need to look at the many layers of history that takes us 
from Coke CJ’s reinterpretation of the Great Charter as simply a restatement 
of the liberties of Englishmen enjoyed from time immemorial – a great legal 
fiction if ever there were one – that rendered the monarch subject to the law to 
the so-called universal international human rights documents of the 20th 
century that seek to establish due process of law as a fundamental right for all 
humankind.   
 
What I would like to do in the remaining time, however, is to uncover a little 
more of how the original radicalism of Cap 29 of the Magna Carta was 
rediscovered and how it eventually found its way across the Atlantic.14 To do 
this we must leap forward to the 18th century to the English radicals who 
sought to challenge a corrupt parliamentary system which protected the 
vested interests of the landed and mercantile classes through the use of 
arbitrary arrest and impeachment to protect parliamentary privilege. Radicals 
such as Beardmore and Burdett resorted to Cap 29 of the Magna Carta to 
defend themselves against the arbitrariness of Parliament’s proceedings 
against them. There actions were recorded in the pamphlets of the day and 
the MC achieved iconic status, even influencing the Chartist movement. It 
was with this radical view of the Magna Carta that the American colonists 
associated themselves, and when they came to order their own affairs it was 
to the liberties of England enshrined in the Magna Carta and the common law 
to which they turned. It is, for example, known that William Penn had a 
facsimile copy of the Magna Carta and that it was the taxation clauses of the 
Charter that underpinned the colonists’ resistance to the Stamp Act of 1765. 
 
Given England’s colonial history it is not surprising that cap 29 of the Magna 
Carta has found its way into a significant number of post-colonial 
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constitutions and bills of rights. The US Fifth Amendment replicates in almost 
precise form the wording of cap 29 by providing in the material part that: 
 
‘no person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law …’ 
 
There is, of course, now a significant and rich corpus of law based on this 
single provision of the US Bill of Rights that has Magna Carta DNA running 
through its veins. 
 
In Australia, Laws LJ as recently as 2001 stated that, Magna Carta had 
enduring significance as a ‘proclamation of the rule of law’ and ‘in this guise 
it followed the English flag even to the Chagos Archipelago.’ 15 And in India, 
a number of decisions have been heavily influenced by provisions of Magna 
Carta.16 
 
Given the pervasive influence of the Anglo-American legal system in the early 
20th century, it is perhaps unsurprising that the post World War II settlement 
– presaged by the Atlantic Charter - was heavily influenced by ideas inherent 
in those systems, particularly by concepts of US constitutional rights given the 
material and political dominance of the US at that time, and the leading role 
played by Eleanor Roosevelt in the drafting of the Universal Declaration. As 
noted above, it was Roosevelt who referred to the Universal Declaraion as the 
‘Magna Carta of mankind’, an unsurprising remark, given the driving force 
behind it. And also as noted above, while the disposition of human rights is 
assumed to be liberal, here they manifest themselves as hegemonic and 
designed to secure a particular (US dominated) world view. 
 
If we examine the Universal Declaration we can see resonances of the Magna 
Carta in a number of its provisions: 
Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.  
Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
Article 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.  
Article 11: Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.  
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Article 17(2): No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.  
To a greater or lesser extent these provisions can be identified in the due 
process rights contained in the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights and a 
whole host of similar binding and non-binding human rights instruments.  
The transformation of the contents of a medieval political settlement that took 
place in the 13th century in a meadow on a small damp off-shore European 
island ought, I think, to command our wonder. Some of the legal concepts 
and principles contained in these modern instruments might to us seem self-
evident, but the tortuous path that has brought them here spans changing 
conceptions of lawyering and the role of law throughout the centuries. I make 
no statement about hegemonies or the virtue or otherwise of the various 
protagonists and antagonists that have brought us to this point, but the 
evolution of these ideas over a significant period of time shows how virile 
and durable these fundamental ideas of law have proved to be. 
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